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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that since 2005, the global security discourse has confused 
maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa with terrorism. American and 
European policymakers and financiers have tapped a vulnerable public 
imaginary to exaggerate Somali pirates as ‘maritime terrorists’ linked to 
Shabaab and Al Qaeda, driving the militarization and legal obfuscation of 
counter-piracy operations. The discursive conflation of piracy and terrorism 
has thereby launched a tactical and legal War on Piracy that mirrors the War on 
Terror. This approach is pushing pirates to become more daring and 
dangerous in response. We conclude that the tactical extension from counter-
terrorism to counter-piracy is unlikely to succeed, as it is insensitive to the 
origins, motives and modus operandi of Somali pirates. The paper proposes a 
shift from military to developmental responses to piracy, with an emphasis on 
respecting local institutions of law enforcement and governance in Somalia. 
Keywords 
Piracy, terrorism, Somalia. 
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‘WAR ON PIRACY’1 
The conflation of Somali piracy with terrorism in discourse, 
tactic and law 
1 Introduction 
With the longest coastline in Africa and its status as a “failure among failed 
states,” Somalia is now the source of 62 percent of all pirate attacks 
worldwide.2 The Gulf of Aden north of Somalia is a corridor of the Suez Canal 
route that links the Mediterranean Sea with the Arabian Sea. Pirate gangs have 
their pick among 20,000 ships that transit the Gulf of Aden annually, including 
those carrying more than 10 percent of the world’s oil supply. The incidence of 
Somali piracy rose gradually from 1991 to 2005, when it took off, and surged 
again in 2008-2009 (see Figure 1). Since then, pirates have pushed out from the 
Gulf of Aden deep into the Indian Ocean (see Figure 2).  
FIGURE 1 
 Incidence of piracy, 1993-2011 (International Maritime Bureau) 
 
 
                                                
1 We thank Margarita Petrova for useful comments.  
Currun Singh: Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals and International Institute 
of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, e-mail: currun@gmail.com.  Arjun 
Singh Bedi: International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, e-
mail: bedi@iss.nl.  
2 Ken Menkhaus, “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts,” Review of African 
Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 97 (2003), p. 407; International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 2011 Report (London: IMB, 2012), p. 6. 
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FIGURE 2 
 Geographical expansion of Somali piracy, January 2005-March 2011 (Geopolicity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2010, the International Maritime Bureau attributed 49 hijackings, 16 
boardings and 151 attempted boardings to Somali pirates. 1016 seafarers were 
held hostage for ransom.3 The vast majority of these hostages were released 
unharmed after shipowners delivered payment, but 14 were reported  
                                                
3 International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 2010 
Report (London: IMB, 2011), p. 8, pp. 11-12. 
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killed.4  Ransom payments to pirates in 2010 totaled US$112.79 million.5 In 
2011, hijackings fell to 28 and hostages fell to 470, but boardings rose to 20, 
attempted boardings rose to 189 and crew fatalities rose to 32.6 Despite fewer 
hijackings, gross pirate revenue also increased in 2011 to an estimated US$160 
million.7 The average ransom payment for a vessel and her crew today is US$5 
million and rising (see Figure 3). The highest ransom paid in 2011 was US$13.5 
million for the Greek oil tanker Irene.8 It is 80 percent more expensive for 
shipowners to avoid the Suez Canal and sail around the Cape of Good Hope 
than it is to take the risk and pay ransom if necessary.9  To buffer the additional 
risk, they take out high-premium insurance, streaming profits to marine 
insurers.  
FIGURE 3 
 Six Ship Moving Average Ransom Reported Paid to Somali Pirates 
(Compass Risk Management) 
 
                                                
4 Compass Risk Management, “Somali Piracy Crew Fatalities, 2007-2012,” last 
modified February 29, 2012, http://www.compass-
rm.com/piracystatistics/Somali_Piracy_Fatalities.pdf. 
5 “Brits arrested with ‘£2.2 million ransom for pirates’,” The Telegraph, February 15, 
2012, accessed April 13, 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/8539542/Brits-arrested-in-
Somalia-with-2.2-million-ransom-for-pirates.html.  
6 IMB, 2011 Report, p. 6; Compass Risk Management, “Somali Piracy Crew Fatalities.” 
7 Anna Bowden and Shikha Basnet, “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy,” One 
Earth Future Foundation (2011), p. 2. 
8 Andrew Mwangura, “VLCC Irene SL Freed by Pirates,” Somalia Report, August 4, 
2011, accessed April 13, 2012, 
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/477/VLCC_Irene_SL_Freed_By_Pi
rates. 
9 Bridget Coggins, “The Pirate Den,” Foreign Policy, No. 180 (2010), p. 87. 
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Somali piracy costs the international community US$7 billion a year, including 
ransom payments, excess insurance premiums, rerouting ships around the 
Cape of Good Hope, naval operations, pirate prosecutions and the effect on 
littoral economies of the region.10 This figure does not consider the cost of 
piracy in terms of maritime trade destruction, which one estimate puts at 
US$25 billion.11 
Piracy originated after state collapse in 1991, as foreign trawlers began 
illegally overfishing Somali waters and local fishermen organized to protect 
their livelihood. The first incidents of Somali piracy were sporadic hijackings or 
quasi-legal extortion of foreign vessels for fees to fish off the Somali coast.12 
Today, piracy organizations range from two fishermen in a skiff to gangs of 
several hundred employees, financed either by shareholders or an individual. 
Generally, the literature prefers the explanation that piracy is an economic 
crime of opportunity—that a young man rationally weighs risks and rewards 
when deciding among alternative livelihoods—to the notions that abject 
poverty or an immutable identity motivates maritime crime.13 Elliot Anderson, 
for example, contends that piracy is “the development of an illegal industry in 
response to an unjust global power dynamic,” namely the international 
community’s inability to self-regulate its exploitation of Somali fisheries.14 Ken 
Menkhaus qualifies this claim: “The Robin Hood narrative of Somali piracy as 
a grassroots form of coastal patrol against rapacious foreign fishing vessels 
is…only partly true, and at any rate has long since been overtaken by less noble 
motives.”15 Indeed, pirates today are professional operatives motivated largely 
by cash; those at the bottom of the piracy hierarchy earn roughly US$9000 per 
ransom payment, which dwarfs annual gross domestic product per capita, less 
                                                
10 Bowden and Basnet, “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy,” p. 1. 
11 See Sami Bensassi and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, “How Costly is Modern 
Maritime Piracy for the International Community?” Munich Personal RePEc Archive 
Paper 27134, University Library of Munich (2010). 
12 For the history of Somali piracy, see Stig Jarle Hansen, “Piracy in the Greater Gulf 
of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies,” Norwegian Institute for Urban and 
Regional Research (2009), pp. 19-33 and Jay Bahadur, Deadly Waters: Inside the Hidden 
World of Somalia’s Pirates (London: Profile, 2011), pp. 25-43. 
13 For good, competing explanations of Somali piracy, see J. Peter Pham, “Putting 
Somali piracy in context,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2010); 
Peter Chalk, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and 
Responses,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2010); Sarah Percy and Anja 
Shortland, “The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” Discussion Paper 1033, DIW Berlin 
(2011); Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg, and Basil Mahayni, “The Dialectics of 
Piracy in Somalia: the rich versus the poor,” Third World Quarterly, Vol., 31, No. 8 
(2010); and James Kraska, “Freakonomics of Maritime Piracy,” Brown Journal of World 
Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2010). 
14 Elliot Anderson, “It’s a Pirate’s Life for Some,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
Vol. 17, No. 2 (2010), p. 319. 
15 Ken Menkhaus, “Dangerous Waters,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 51, 
No. 1 (2009), pp. 22-23. 
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than US$300.16 Non-monetary benefits sometimes accrue to pirates, mainly a 
mythic social capital believed to buy the latest technology, the biggest houses 
and the prettiest wives.17 Of course, fragile state institutions like poor law 
enforcement are also to blame for the rise in piracy. J. Peter Pham writes, 
“While state collapse is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause an outbreak of 
maritime piracy, the spectacular failure of the Somali state has certainly 
facilitated the emergence of the phenomenon…so as to produce the ‘perfect 
storm’.”18 
As will be discussed shortly, the international community has militarized 
the fight against Somali piracy. In the age of terror, this militarization has 
hinged on the framing of pirates as ‘maritime terrorists’, and governments have 
declared that pirates cooperate with militant Islamists in Somalia, subsuming 
counter-piracy under the global War on Terror. Over thirty nations’ naval 
forces have been deployed to Somali waters since the end of 2008 to deter 
pirates, but the incidence of attacks has more than doubled since then, and 
pirates have adopted more sophisticated technology in response, using more 
dangerous arms and motherships to sail further out to sea.19 
The stage for this offshore drama is a complicated set of governance 
structures onshore. Civil war led to the collapse of the post-colonial regime of 
Siad Barre in 1991, paving the way for the most expensive humanitarian 
operation ever undertaken, followed by fourteen attempts by the international 
community to piece together a central government. Somalia currently tops 
every ranking of failed states, while clan-based sub-states like Somaliland and 
Puntland have declared autonomy and maintain relatively stable governments 
and economies (see Figure 4). Alongside the resurgence of piracy is the 
emergence of Harakat Ashabaab Al-Mujahideen (Shabaab), Somalia’s largest 
and deadliest terrorist organization, which has taken control of most of 
southern Somalia. From 2007, Shabaab fought daily on the streets of 
Mogadishu to unseat the internationally-backed Transitional Federal 
Government, which has generally controlled just a few blocks of the capital. In 
August 2011, Shabaab mysteriously withdrew from Mogadishu, but the 
Transitional Federal Government remains incapacitated. In February 2012, 
Shabaab and Al-Qaeda announced a provisional merger. The concurrent rise 
of maritime hijackings and terrorist violence in Somalia has created an 
impression of rampant criminality vulnerable to the conflation of piracy with 
terrorism. 
                                                
16 See Bahadur, Deadly Waters, pp. 223-233. Given elongating ransom negotiation 
periods and the growing complexity of the pirate value chain, the lowest ranked 
pirates (cooks and holders) probably earn about half of Bahadur’s generous estimate 
of US$9000. The most recent estimate for Somali gross domestic product per capita is 
US$220 (World Statistics Pocketbook, United Nations Statistics Division, 2009). 
17 See Robyn Hunter, “Somali pirates living the high life,” BBC News, October 28, 
2008, accessed April 24, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7650415.stm.  
18 Pham, “Putting Somali piracy in context,” p. 330. 
19 According to the IMB’s annual reports, there were 112 attacks in 2008, 219 attacks 
in 2009, 216 attacks in 2010, and 237 attacks in 2011.  
10 
 
FIGURE 4 
 Political Map of ‘Somalia’, April 2012 (BBC News) 
 
 
This paper aims to trace the conflation of Somali piracy and terrorism in the 
global security discourse from its origins through its precipitation to its 
contemporary manifestations in counter-piracy and counter-terrorism 
operations. It is couched in securitization theory, which focuses on the 
intersubjective processes of state and non-state actors presenting and justifying 
issues as existential threats requiring emergency measures outside the bounds 
of normal political procedure.20 Thus, to the extent that the articulation of a 
security threat determines its graveness, security can be examined as “a 
discourse through which identities and threats are constituted rather than 
[purely] as an objective, material condition.”21 Discourse here is taken as an 
extended stretch of conversation, orientations and activities among 
policymakers, media and the public, within a loose but particular framework. 
And while constructivist in methodology, the paper is positivist in its insistence 
that discourse creates permissible conditions for existent policies and practices. 
Its methods include an extensive literature review; a discourse analysis of policy 
documents and media reports; eight semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders in Kenya (see Appendix for list of informants); and a perusal of 
piracy case files at the Mombasa Law Courts, Kenya. The conflation of piracy 
and terrorism has been previously elaborated in terms of post-9/11 rhetoric 
                                                
20 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 
21 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 243. 
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and, regionally, in Southeast Asia. This paper brings these arguments up to 
date and extends them for the first time to the Somali case, while offering an 
original analysis of how this discourse has shaped and sharpened Western 
instruments of war and law in the region to bring development in the Horn of 
Africa in line with the War on Terror.  
Such security concerns are endogenous to human and international 
development. Security is often integral to the expansion of personal choices, 
the growth of communities and the provision of entitlements. Conversely, 
poor conditions of development like inter-group inequality or state ‘failure’ or 
‘fragility’ are commonly believed sources of conflict.22 This is especially true in 
sub-Saharan Africa and since 9/11, when the security-development nexus 
intensified to compensate for the externalities of ungoverned spaces.23 Wil 
Hout writes, “The reconstruction of ‘fragile states’ is the latest witness to the 
securitisation of development.”24 In brief, the US and European Union fear 
that terrorist organizations, drug cartels and other such transnational criminal 
gangs will flourish wherever the rule of law is weak. But as Kees Biekhart, 
Claire Mainguy, Andrew Mold and Mansoob Murshed expound, “The danger 
resides in the way in which all social progress (i.e. ‘development’) may come to 
a halt if reactionary forces manage to convince us that new dangers are 
constantly on the horizons.”25  
With this in mind, the next section reviews the construction of the threat 
of ‘maritime terrorism’ after 9/11 but before the Somali piracy surge in 2005. 
Section 3 explains, traces and disputes the discursive conflation of Somali 
piracy with terrorism since the surge. Section 4 demonstrates the penetration 
of this discourse into contemporary military and legal strategies of counter-
piracy. Finally, the conclusion presents a few alternative, desecuritized policy 
options to address Somali crime and governance. 
                                                
22 See Frances Stewart, “Development and Security,” Working Paper 3, Centre for 
Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford (2005). 
23 See Morten Bøås and Kathleen Jennings, “Insecurity and Development: The 
Rhetoric of the ‘Failed State’,” European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No. 3 
(2005); Jonathan Di John, “The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: 
A Critical Review of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference 
to Sub-Saharan Africa,” European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2010); 
and Stephan Klingebiel, “Regional Security in Africa and the Role of External 
Support,” European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2005).  
24 Wil Hout, “Between Security and Development: the European Union, governance 
and fragile states,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2010), p. 141. 
25 Kees Biekhart, Claire Mainguy, Andrew Mold and Mansoob Murshed, “Insecurity 
and Development: Regional Issues and Policies for an Interdependent World,” 
European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2005), p. 358. 
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2 The post-9/11 conflation of  piracy and terrorism, 2001-
2005: a review 
 This section reviews the post-9/11 “rhetoric of ‘floating bombs’” that 
confused piracy worldwide with terrorism worldwide and challenges the 
credibility of this threat of ‘maritime terrorism’.26  
In international and customary law, piracy and terrorism are distinct 
crimes. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as 
“acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private 
ends…on the high seas…outside the jurisdiction of any State.”27 The 
International Maritime Organization broadens this definition to include 
“armed robbery against ships…within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic 
waters and territorial sea.”28 Together, these definitions typify piracy as a 
private, non-political act. In contradistinction, while definitions of terrorism 
vary widely, terrorism is commonly the employment of violence against non-
combatants for the manipulation of political or ideological ends.  
There can be overlap between these definitions, of course, in “political 
piracy.”29 The conflation of piracy and terrorism is rooted in the perceived 
threat of ‘maritime terrorism’, a label covering both (a) politically motivated 
attacks against vessels or structures at sea and (b) politically motivated attacks 
on land for which ships are used to transport arms or operatives.30 Potential 
tactics include: “explosives-laden suicide boats…commercial vessels as launch 
platforms for missile attacks; underwater swimmers to infiltrate ports; 
unmanned underwater explosive delivery vehicles…[and underwater] mines.”31 
Al-Qaeda has launched two iconic maritime suicide attacks from Yemen, one 
against the US destroyer USS Cole in 2000 in the port of Aden and the other 
against the French oil tanker Limburg in the Gulf of Aden in 2002.  
By far the largest perceived threat is that terrorists will use vessels as 
‘floating bombs’—using “merchant and cruise ships as kinetic weapons to ram 
another vessel, warship, port facility, or offshore platform”—causing mass-
                                                
26 Jeremy Engels, “Floating Bombs Encircling Our Shores: Post-9/11 Rhetorics of 
Piracy and Terrorism,” Cultural Studies  Critical Methodologies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), p. 
328. 
27 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Article 101. 
28 International Maritime Organization, “Code of Practice for the Investigation of 
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships [Resolution A.1025(26)],” Annex, 
Section 2.1 (2009). 
29 Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, “Terrorism at Sea: The Historical Development of an 
International Legal Response,” in Violence at sea: A review of terrorism, acts of war and 
piracy, and countermeasures to prevent terrorism, ed. Brian A.H. Parritt (Paris: International 
Chamber of Commerce Publishing SA, 1986), p. 192, quoted in Adam Young and 
Mark Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and 
Utility,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2003), p. 270. 
30 See Michael Greenberg et al., Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability, RAND Center for 
Terrorism Risk Management Policy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), pp. 9-
28. 
31 White House, “National Strategy for Maritime Security” (2005), p. 4. 
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casualty destruction.32 The root of this perception lies in 9/11. Barry Buzan 
and Lene Hansen explain, “One of the curious twists of 9/11 was the way it 
put emphasis on the vulnerability of [civil infrastructure] to [attack using] 
readily available civil technologies as weapons.”33 In addition to planting a 
“nuclear or radiological dirty bomb…on a vessel in a major port,” terrorists 
can also leverage a vessel’s cargo—like chemicals, petroleum or liquefied 
natural gas—as explosive material.34 Jeremy Engels writes that an oil tanker, if 
“exploded in a port such as Singapore, Boston, or Galveston, would wreak 
more havoc than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”35 
Indeed, after 9/11, while US policymakers and media launched their War 
on Terror from the Khyber Pass to the Persian Gulf, from the Sahara to the 
southern Philippines, they also hypothesized the union of maritime pirates and 
terrorists, what Engels calls the “rhetoric of ‘floating bombs’.” The 2002 
National Security Strategy of the United States argues, “Terrorism will be 
viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no 
respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose.”36 
Engels claims this statement discursively grouped piracy with premeditated 
political violence. Southeast Asia, where maritime raiding had long been a 
legitimate part of trade and warfare, became the first suspect region between 
2002 and 2005, especially as militant secessionists in Muslim areas of the 
Philippines and Indonesia adopted more violent maritime tactics. Adam Young 
and Mark Valencia write, “Since the events of 11 September 2001, the 
conflation of ‘piracy’ and ‘terrorism’ has become common in the mass media 
and government policy statements, both within and outside [Southeast Asia].”37 
For example, an October 2003 article in the Economist and a subsequent report 
in Foreign Affairs dwelled on the terrorist motivations behind the hijacking of 
the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia—an 
allegation made initially by Aegis Defence Services, a London-based private 
military contractor, and later deemed hogwash by the International Maritime 
Bureau and the ship’s owner.38 In July 2005, the Lloyd’s Joint War Committee 
(JWC), a London network of marine insurers, classified the Strait of Malacca as 
a war risk area because of the risk of piracy and maritime terrorism. The JWC 
based this rating on a controversial report it had commissioned to Aegis 
Defence Services. Under pressure, the JWC withdrew this classification in 
August 2006. 
The withdrawal of the Strait of Malacca as a war risk area signals that 
despite the fear that pervades the discourse of maritime terrorism, most 
analysts concur it constitutes a less than credible threat. Peter Chalk of the 
                                                
32 Ibid., p. 4. 
33 Buzan and Hansen, Evolution of International Security Studies, p. 239-240. 
34 White House, “National Strategy for Maritime Security,” p. 24. 
35 Engels, “Floating Bombs,” p. 331. 
36 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States” (2002), p. 6. 
37 Young and Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” p. 
269. 
38 Martin Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 388 
(London: Routledge/International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2007), pp. 7-8. 
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RAND Corporation claims, “The world’s oceans have not been a major locus 
of terrorist activity,” and calculates from the RAND Terrorism Database that 
only two percent of all international terrorist attacks over the past thirty years 
have been against maritime targets.39 Naval scholar Martin Murphy asserts, 
“Maritime terrorism has posed a threat to a very modest number of countries” 
and that “these threats have been largely peripheral.”40 Though acknowledging 
that “one cannot completely discount the rather widespread fears of much 
worse to come,” Bjørn Møller of the Danish Institute for International Studies 
judges that “maritime terrorism has so far been a very minor problem.” He 
adds that the worst case scenarios are “highly unlikely” and that some well-
publicized maritime attacks have had “rather insignificant consequences.”41  
There are two reasons for the “relative paucity” of maritime terrorism: (1) 
logistical challenges and (2) limited public resonance. First, as Chalk notes, “In 
a world of finite human and material assets, the costs and unpredictability 
associated with expanding to the maritime realm have typically trumped any 
potential benefits that might be garnered from initiating such a change in 
operational direction.” Chalk refers here to the “mariner skills” and “specialist 
capabilities” necessary to plan and execute an attack at sea, for terrorists who 
are “inherently conservative when it comes to choosing attack modalities” due 
to limited resources and “ceilings in operational finance.”42 Murphy elaborates, 
“The sinking of a large cruise ship or ferry, killing thousands of 
Westerners…or the execution of multiple and harmful attacks on the world’s 
maritime transport system are all scenarios that are less easily brought about 
than equivalent events on land.” Second, an attack at sea is unlikely to elicit as 
much publicity as an attack on land, making maritime terrorism less attractive 
and less productive for terrorists. While admitting some maritime attacks have 
“briefly caught Western media attention,” Murphy states, “As a rule, when 
attacks have been mounted at sea, the results in terms of publicity have been 
limited.”43 
Maritime terrorism has witnessed a “modest yet highly discernable spike” 
in the past decade.44 But Murphy insists, “It is important not to exaggerate the 
threat from maritime terrorism.” Referencing UK Admiral Sir Alan West’s 
assertion that maritime terrorism is a “clear and present danger” that could 
“potentially cripple global trade,” Murphy calls this “surely an overestimation 
of the threat.” He warns, 
                                                
39 Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and 
Challenges for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 19. 
40 Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, p. 70. 
41 Bjørn Møller, “Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy,” Danish Institute for 
International Studies (2009), pp. 23-25. 
42 Chalk, Maritime Dimension of International Security, pp. 19-20. 
43 Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, p. 69. 
44 Chalk, Maritime Dimension of International Security, p. 19. 
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Discussion of maritime terrorism in the media, the academy and intelligence 
agencies can suffer from circularity, whereby analysts and commentators discuss 
possible scenarios, terrorists listen, analysts then pick up chatter that reflects their 
speculations, and take it to be proof that their suspicions were correct.45 
Thus, the discursive “chatter” about pirates conducting terrorist attacks, 
though unwarranted, gathered speed after 9/11, crystallizing anxiety into 
policies like those toward Southeast Asia.  
But if the threat were incredible, why would piracy be exaggerated as 
terrorism? Adam Young and Mark Valencia suggest that, since 9/11, maritime 
powers have inflated the threat of maritime terrorism to exert pressure on 
weaker states to sign the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), and use 
the case of Southeast Asia to illustrate their point. Largely drafted in response 
to the Palestinian Liberation Front’s hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship in 
1985, the SUA Convention extends state jurisdiction over international waters 
and mandates cooperation with maritime terrorism prosecutions of other 
States Parties. More recently, it has been promoted as a counter-piracy 
measure. Young and Valencia deduce that the US and other maritime powers 
are hoping for the SUA to get them a foot in the door in terms of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of terrorism. The states of Southeast Asia, 
including Malaysia and Indonesia, have largely declined accession to these 
conventions, since they threaten the sovereignty of transitional states and states 
with disputed maritime boundaries. “However,” Young and Valencia contend, 
“if ‘piracy’ and ‘terrorism’ are fused into a general threat to maritime security, 
developing countries may find outside ‘help’ easier to accept and to ‘sell’ to 
their domestic polity.” So, the authors continue, “It may be in the United 
States’ interest to conflate piracy and terrorism to persuade reluctant 
developing countries to assist maritime powers pursue pirates and terrorists in 
their territorial and archipelagic waters.”46 
Importantly, while pirates have been analogized to terrorists since 9/11, 
initially it was the other way around. Paul Silverstein demonstrates how in the 
immediate wake of 9/11, pundits deemed the Barbary ‘pirates’ of Ottoman 
North Africa the “historical forebears of twenty-first-century Islamist militants, 
as ‘terrorists by another name’.”47 The First Barbary War—begun with the 
dispatch of the US Marines to Tripoli in 1801—even inspired Captain Glenn 
Voelz, a history professor at West Point, to wonder if “we are still fighting the 
same war” two hundred years later.48 Silverstein writes, “The Barbary Analogy 
has been a potent arm in the ideological battle that has paralleled the…war on 
                                                
45 Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, p. 71. 
46 Young and Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” pp. 
276-277. 
47 Paul Silverstein, “The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African 
Frontier,” The 
New Centennial Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2005), p. 180. 
48 Richard Leiby, “Terrorists by Another Name,” The Washington Post, October 15, 
2001, quoted in Silverstein, “New Barbarians,” p. 180. 
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terror…The equation of piracy and terrorism has outlined a wider field of 
international engagement that has further reified the geographic and cultural 
poles of a putative ‘clash of civilization’.”49 The Barbary Analogy was made 
before Somali piracy ever grabbed the headlines, but its field of engagement 
has widened since 2005 to spin contemporary maritime crime off the Horn of 
Africa as a trend of global jihad.  
3  The discursive conflation of  piracy and terrorism in 
Somalia, 2005-2012 
Given the discursive construction of the global threat of ‘maritime terrorism’ 
since 9/11, as discussed in Section 2, this section (1) traces the extension of 
this rhetoric of ‘floating bombs’ to Somalia and (2) refutes the claim that 
Somali piracy and terrorism are linked or identical. 
The case of Somalia 
After Somali piracy surged early in 2005, the administration of US President 
George W. Bush issued the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) in 
September the same year. The opening lines of the NSMS read, “The safety 
and economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the 
world’s oceans. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal 
government has reviewed and strengthened all of its strategies to combat the 
evolving threat in the War on Terrorism.”50 Thus, in a single turn, 
contemporary maritime security fell under the ambit of the War on Terror. The 
NSMS makes a further conjecture to link piracy with terrorism: it fears that 
“the capabilities to board and commandeer large underway vessels—
demonstrated in numerous piracy incidents—could also be employed to 
facilitate terrorist acts.”51 The Bush administration followed suit with the Policy 
for the Repression of Piracy and Other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea in 
2007, which interprets piracy as a terrorist threat. This document outlines a 
single policy to address both piracy “for private ends” and “criminal and 
terrorist activities not defined as piracy.” It justifies this grouping by saying, 
“The combination of illicit activity and violence at sea might…be associated 
with…terrorism.”52 Lending credence to Young and Valencia’s analysis on 
Southeast Asia, the document proposes the SUA Convention as the relevant 
legal standard for both crimes. 
The Bush administration seized advantage of the dramatic rise in piracy 
off the Horn of Africa to press its regional counter-terrorism ambitions, which 
were live from October 2002 with the launch of Operation Enduring 
Freedom—Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), part of the US war in Afghanistan. 
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By February 2006, the CIA was funneling US$100,000 a month to an alliance 
of warlords (The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism) 
to crush the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a locally popular network of sharia 
courts many analysts have judged moderate and peaceful.53 Pushed to defend 
itself, the ICU militarized, defeated the warlords and assumed control of 
Mogadishu in June 2006. OEF-HOA then aided an Ethiopian military 
intervention to eliminate ICU rule in December 2006 and January 2007.54 The 
US contributed to this war because it was aware and afraid of affiliations some 
members of the ICU might have had with Al-Qaeda, though such allegations 
were largely unsubstantiated.55 While there was proof that Somalia played a 
minor role in Al-Qaeda operations (i.e., as a transit point for arms and 
operatives), by itself this proof never sufficed to justify direct military 
intervention, as the Bush administration had debated internally as early as 
2002.56 Effectively, the Bush administration exploited the coincidence of 
militant Islamism and maritime crime in the Horn of Africa from 2005, 
exaggerating piracy as a trend of global jihad to advance its counter-terrorism 
agenda for the region.  
This strategy worked because in the Western social imaginary, reports, 
photographs and YouTube videos of Somali pirates taking sailors hostage are 
difficult to differentiate from those of terrorists taking passengers, journalists 
and aid workers hostage. Armed Muslim youth, in an environment of 
lawlessness, conflict and poverty, are kidnapping international targets on the 
high seas with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. Incidents of 
kidnapping for ransom look like acts of terrorism, which are 
“choreographed…to achieve maximum publicity” and often involve “holding 
hostages whose survival then depends on meeting certain demands.”57 The 
assumed parallelism becomes dominant because “cognitively and affectively, it 
is easier to act on old, concrete fears than on new, untested hopes.”58 For the 
public, “terrorism” even becomes a “term of comfort,” according to Engels, 
because “in the midst of murky…threats, terrorist violence [is] comfortable 
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because it…[can] be defeated by the American military.”59 The public 
fascination with hostage situations, rooted in the imaginary of terrorism and 
nurtured by the media, further confuses the general perception of the pirate 
problem, as it seems to have all the right ingredients for militant Islamism. 
Murphy articulates the potential challenge facing the US and its allies:  
If al-Shabab were to gain access to the northern coast of Puntland, then its 
terrorists would certainly be better positioned to attack international shipping 
using pirate tactics. The situation would become even worse if Yemen, already 
politically fragile, also fell under Islamist sway…[putting] both sides of the Gulf 
of Aden…in hostile hands…Ceding control of the Horn of Africa and exposing 
shipping and naval vessels to greater risk would be a nightmare in waiting for 
Washington and many of its allies.60 
Of course, while this “nightmare” scenario is unlikely, it is invoked to generate 
fear. Short of the worst case scenario, in which Al-Qaeda and Somali pirates 
combine forces to wreak global havoc, pirates are rumored to have operational 
and financial interactions with militant Islamists. Jay Bahadur, a journalist of 
Somali piracy, writes, “In a world dominated by the discourse of the war on 
terror, various policy analysts, journalists, and politicians pushing particular 
agendas inevitably began to speculate about pirate cash ending up in the hands 
of terrorists.”61 Some of these claims are elaborate: the London-based Jane’s 
Terrorism and Security Monitor reported in 2008 that pirates were transporting 
arms and fighters for Shabaab in return for training and weapons, and that the 
two forces had trained together in naval tactics.62 Reports abound of pirates 
paying 20-50 percent of ransom money to Shabaab.63 The claim goes that 
because Shabaab has expanded its domain to include pirate ports like Kismayo 
since August 2008 and Xarardheere since December 2010, pirates must be 
paying commission to Shabaab in arms, cash or services.64 Not one of these 
allegations has been proven, and they are disputed below. 
Among the most vocal proponents of the pirate-jihadi nexus are marine 
insurers. If terrorists endanger certain waters, underwriters can categorize these 
as areas of enhanced risk and multiply insurance rates up to 300 fold for ships 
sailing those waters. Additionally, kidnap and ransom insurance has multiplied 
ten fold, cargo insurance premiums in war risk areas have risen by between 
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US$25 and US$100 per container, and hull insurance has doubled due to 
piracy.65  
As early as 2004, Lloyd’s of London, the world’s largest and oldest marine 
insurer, published articles in its newsletter with the following titles: 
Maritime terrorism is a ticking timebomb: The global supply chain is in jeopardy. 
Pirates have evolved from clusters of commercial plunderers to a sinister and 
organised force that relishes the prospect of toying with the levers of the world 
economy. 
We ignore threats at our peril: We may think terrorist attacks are unlikely, but, if 
they happen, they will be devastating—and piracy is a real threat.66 
With such melodramatic language, insurers inject panic into the piracy 
discourse “to produce knowledge of risk by objectifying everything into 
degrees of chance of harm,” because they know their “rates ebb and flow to 
the degree that a perception of danger is rhetorically constructed.”67 In March 
2006, Lloyd’s decreed that pirate attacks and terrorist attacks would be covered 
by a single scheme for policyholders because of “difficulty in distinguishing” 
between the two.68 The Lloyd’s Joint War Committee then designated the Gulf 
of Aden a war risk area in May 2008. In April 2009, Lord Peter Levene, then 
Lloyd’s chairman, announced, “Nearly all of the ships pirated this year are 
insured within Lloyd’s either by hull underwriters, hull war underwriters, 
kidnap and ransom underwriters or through reinsurance. And the peril of 
piracy, traditionally covered by the hull policy, is currently being moved into 
the war policy.”69 Due to these shifts, marine insurers earned US$635 million 
in 2011 from piracy-related insurance premiums, dwarfing the US$160 million 
earned by Somali pirates last year.70 This makes Lloyd’s the biggest profiteer of 
Somali piracy and the party most invested in the propagation of the pirate-
jihadi nexus.  
The conflation of piracy and terrorism in Somalia—thus fueled by certain 
political and financial interests, the remote threat of Al-Qaeda commandeering 
pirate ships, and a vulnerable public imaginary—has fed a media circus. A 
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small sampling of titles of implicated newspaper articles and books: “Warnings 
from Al Qaeda Stir Fear that Terrorists May Attack Oil Tankers”; “The Next 
9/11 Could Happen at Sea”; “Ocean Terrorists”; Terror on the Seas: True Tales of 
Modern-Day Pirates; “Somali Pirates Form Unholy Alliance with Islamists”; Pirate 
State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea; “Jihad and Piracy in Somalia.” 
Under conditions of uncertainty, the repeated invocation of these possible 
connections, however unwitting, has achieved a critical mass that makes the 
Somali pirate-jihadi nexus real and amplifies its threat. This process is parallel 
(though substantively different) to the production of the terrorist threat. Barry 
Buzan and Lene Hansen explain, “The constitution of terrorist profiles 
is…always prophetic, seeking to identify the future threat, and thereby 
ultimately producing its own subject.”71 It now appears that Somali piracy can 
only mean something or merit public attention within the terror discourse.72  
Defusing the ‘floating bombs’ fallacy 
Like the global threat of maritime terrorism, as discussed in Section 2, the 
discursive conflation of Somali pirates and terrorists is also less than credible. 
There are distinct signs of rivalry, rather than cooperation, between pirates and 
militants in Somalia. When the Islamic Courts Union came to power in 
Mogadishu in 2006, inheriting a surge in piracy, it publicly declared piracy 
haram and ended all maritime crime, taking special efforts to crack down on 
pirate bases and threatening pirates with punishment under sharia. On ICU 
watch in the last six months of 2006, there was only one reported hijacking, of 
the vessel Veesham I, and the ICU tracked it down within a week and rescued 
it.73 
More recently, since Hizbul Islam, a splinter group of the ICU, conquered 
the pirate ports of Xarardheere and Hobyo in April 2010 (and Shabaab later 
absorbed them), there have been conflicting reports about the relationship 
between pirates and militants in the surrounding region. Some report a deal 
whereby Shabaab earns a 20-50 percent commission for vessels held and 
ransomed at Xarardheere, while others report such a deal went sour when the 
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two parties could not agree on a cut.74 Some outlets report that Shabaab leader 
Sheikh Hassan Afrah—of the same sub-clan (Suleiman) as the majority of 
Xarardheere pirates—is responsible for receiving Shabaab’s cut from pirate 
ransoms and troubleshooting frictions between the two parties.75 And yet other 
sources report that Sheikh Yusuf Sheikh Isse, Shabaab’s governor for the 
region, purged its towns of pirate activities.76 Interviews with stakeholders in 
Kenya confirm and dispel some rumors about cooperation between Shabaab 
and the pirates of Xarardheere. Andrew Mwangura, a renowned pirate 
negotiator and founder of the Seafarers’ Assistance Programme in Mombasa, 
Kenya, believes that “a pact was made last year [2010] between the 
Xarardheere [pirate] group and Al-Shabaab” that involved a percentage cut, 
but that the pirates only agreed in order “to cool them [Shabaab] down.” 
Mwangura says the sustainability of this pact is “impossible” and that it “won’t 
hold water,” primarily because pirates do not want to confront terrorist 
financing laws, which would proscribe the payment of ransoms to pirates if 
they were Shabaab affiliates.77 As one Somalia analyst puts it, for pirates, 
“giving money to Al-Shabaab…[is] simply a very, very bad business 
decision.”78 Aden Maow Abdi of the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) suggests Shabaab may be extracting “access fees” from 
pirates in Xarardheere as it does from humanitarian agencies as a “cost of 
doing business,” especially since Shabaab is “under financial pressure.”79 
Though terrorist financing laws may disagree, there is a clear distinction 
between paying, say, a port toll and commissioning suicide bombers, or 
between extracting such a toll and commissioning pirate ships to sea. 
According to Mwangura, there is further proof that pirates have set sail from 
southern ports controlled by Shabaab, but anchored hijacked vessels further 
north in Puntland while ransoms were negotiated, to avoid Shabaab’s port 
commissions and sharia law.80 In sum, it appears that Shabaab, under financial 
pressure, coerced pirates of Xarardheere into a financial arrangement that is 
not buoyant in the long term, and has probably already sunk. Lauren Ploch of 
the Congressional Research Service concludes, “US Navy officials have not 
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found that fighters associated with Al Shabaab have financial ties to piracy at 
present, but the potential for personnel linkages may remain.”81 
In the only two instances of large-sample research with Somali pirates, 
interviewees have not presented ideological or political motivations for their 
crimes and have denied affiliation with militant Islamist groups. Bahadur 
writes, “During my months in Puntland, I questioned every pirate I met about 
Islamist ties, and received the same vehement denials from every one.”82 
Karine Hamilton writes, “While conducting research in Kenya where over 100 
Somalis accused of piracy are currently imprisoned and undergoing 
prosecution, I found general consensus that Somali piracy was unrelated to 
Islamic politics and was instead strictly an economic crime.”83 Admittedly, 
Puntland and Kenya are not the most likely places to find a pirate-jihadi nexus, 
but at least a handful of Bahadur’s and Hamilton’s interviewees were from 
southern Somalia. 
Hamilton’s finding that Somali piracy is “strictly an economic crime” is 
reinforced in the broader literature. Bjørn Møller distinguishes between 
maritime terrorism and piracy, the former “for the sake of some higher cause” 
and the latter “for selfish reasons.” He insists, “Whereas it is conceivable that 
maritime terrorists will gradually transform themselves into pirates, a 
transformation in the opposite direction is well nigh inconceivable,” and the 
links between the two groups, “largely non-existent.”84 Peter Chalk arrives at 
the same conclusion: “To date, there has been no credible evidence to support 
speculation about…a nexus emerging [between pirates and terrorists].” He 
claims that while the “objectives of the two actors remain entirely different,” 
the “presumed convergence” between piracy and maritime terrorism “has 
informed the perceptions of governments, international organizations, and 
major shipping interests around the world.”85  
Interviews with counter-piracy professionals in Kenya confirm that this 
discursive conflation has penetrated counter-piracy practices. For example, 
Shamus Mangan, Prosecutions Advisor of the Counter Piracy Programme of 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), says,  
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There is anecdotal evidence of links between Al-Shabaab and pirates. Somalia is a 
competition among militias, clans, terrorists and other groups. I’m sure there’s 
links between different things…Pirates and terrorists are right next to each other. 
I’m sure you can imagine [links between them]…There are obviously links. It 
seems pretty clear that there are at least financial deals between Al-Shabaab and 
pirates.86 
Similarly, Alex Muteti, Principal State Counsel at Kenya’s Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions and a member of its counter-piracy task force, says,  
No one has properly traced piracy proceeds to Al-Shabaab and its network. It’s 
an old question of rumor and fact. You can speculate one way or the other, but 
you can’t rule it out. Pirates have admitted to gunrunning and trafficking between 
Somalia and Yemen. They will not tell you they’re terrorists, but with 
connections to two kinds of crime, you can imagine a window to other kinds of 
crime…87 
Mangan and Muteti both ask that one “imagine” the connections between 
pirates and terrorists, which is far from the legal standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Such imaginations necessarily rest in the realm of the 
discursive, but shape counter-piracy practices, to which we now turn. 
4 ‘War on Piracy’: the tactical and legal conflation of  
piracy and terrorism in Somalia 
Since the extension of the rhetoric of ‘floating bombs’ to Somalia, as discussed 
in Section 3, the international community has predicated its counter-piracy 
strategies on the War on Terror, in effect launching a War on Piracy. This War 
on Piracy entails (1) the militarization of the seas and (2) the obfuscation of the 
law, mirroring existing counter-terrorism strategies and disregarding the actual 
nature of piracy.  
The militarization of the seas amid rising violence 
In October 2008, NATO deployed its warships to patrol Somali waters and 
escort vessels carrying food aid. In December 2008, the European Union 
launched its first naval mission, the EU Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) 
or Operation Atalanta, to prevent and disrupt piracy off the Somali coast and 
to escort humanitarian vessels. Around this time, the navies of China, Russia, 
India, Japan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, South Korea, Yemen and the United 
Arab Emirates launched independent counter-piracy missions. Pirates, it 
seemed, were an enemy against whom the whole world could unite.88 
The US National Security Council’s December 2008 report, “Countering 
Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan,” recommended 
the deployment of “law enforcement and naval air and surface assets” to 
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strengthen patrols of the Gulf of Aden.89 It continued, “We will seize and 
destroy any implements of piracy and, in appropriate cases, seize and destroy 
vessels outfitted for piracy.”90 On January 12, 2009, twelve days before 
President Bush left office, the US Navy established Combined Task Force 
(CTF) 151 to conduct such search and destroy missions to combat piracy off 
the Horn of Africa. CTF 151 is a division of the Combined Maritime Forces 
(CMF), a multinational naval partnership mandated to secure Middle Eastern 
waters as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. But the creation of CTF 151 
was only a formality; CMF already operated CTF 150, which was protecting 
the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea from terrorism through the use of search 
and destroy missions, and which had used these tactics in encounters with 
pirates since 2006.91 In August 2008, CTF 150 had also created a Maritime 
Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden to protect its shipping interests from 
“destabilizing activities.”92 So, while CTF 151 was established after NATO’s 
and the EU’s forces, the US, through CTF 150, was the progenitor of the 
militarization of counter-piracy.  
With its roots in CTF 150, CTF 151 embodies the idea that identical 
tactics and units should be used to fight piracy as to fight terrorism. Admiral 
Mark Fox, current commander of both forces, confirmed this when he said 
that “only counter-terrorism measures” can defeat Somali piracy, saying he is 
“loathe to hope or to assume [a linkage between pirates and Al-Shabaab] hasn’t 
occurred.”93 With their tactical roots in the War on Terror, and their rhetorical 
justification found in the Bush administration’s conflation of piracy and 
terrorism, the US, NATO and EU naval missions off the Horn of Africa 
amount to a War on Piracy.  
These naval missions operate under the sanction of UN Security Council 
resolutions, which since June 2008 have authorized states to enter the 
territorial waters of Somalia and use “all necessary means” to repress acts of 
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piracy.94 In December 2008, the UN Security Council extended this 
authorization to “land-based operations” and “all necessary measures that are 
appropriate in Somalia.”95 Condoleeza Rice, then US Secretary of State, said 
that “pursuing pirates on land would have a significant impact” and that 
“maritime operations alone were insufficient for combating piracy.”96 
Indeed, despite the strength deployed, naval patrols are probably among 
the most fruitless military operations. There are simply too few ships to patrol 
the 6.5 million square kilometers (or 2.5 million square miles) of the southern 
Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Somali Basin where piracy is 
concentrated.97 With the current deployment, assuming an immediate distress 
call is sent, a ship must successfully evade boarding for at least twenty minutes 
before a naval helicopter or warship reaches the scene, which is a long time for 
lethargic tankers chased by deft craft.98 Upon arrival of the navy, if the attack 
has escalated to a hostage situation, the rules of engagement generally 
proscribe further action. Shipowner reports to the International Maritime 
Bureau frequently express frustration that distress calls go unanswered 
altogether.  
Based on their econometric model, Anja Shortland and Marc Vothknecht 
suggest that while the Maritime Security Patrol Area and its companion, the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, in the Gulf of Aden may 
reduce the number of successful attacks by 4 percent and the probability that a 
given attack will be successful by 20 percent, those same measures may 
increase the total incidence of piracy by as much as 18 percent.99 The authors 
reason these naval measures may streamline vessels for attack, effectively 
making them sitting ducks stolen right under the noses of the mightiest navies 
of the world. After controlling for confounding variables, these negative 
effects disappear, and the authors conclude that “naval counter-piracy efforts 
have therefore not been counter-productive, but they have failed to deter (an 
increasing number of) pirate crews from trying their luck in the Gulf of 
Aden.”100 Still, supporting the initial interpretation, Shortland and Vothknecht 
calculate that pirates appear more likely to attack after a successful naval 
interception, and that they do not appear to fear the prospect of arrest.  
According to Noor M. Noor, President of the Puntland Non-State Actors’ 
Association (PUNSAA), from the Somali perspective, the navies are 
“protecting illegal fishing vessels but not protecting the fishermen.”101 This 
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perception is exacerbated by the mistakes of naval forces; Shamus Mangan of 
UNODC states, “The majority of apprehended ‘pirates’ are released at sea, in 
part because you never know if naval interceptions are of regular fishermen.”102 
Upon the launch of all naval operations in 2009, attacks in the Gulf of 
Aden dropped 50 percent the next year, but pirates sailed further out to sea for 
prey, as far South as the Seychelles, and total attacks amounted to a record 
high.103 Peter Chalk of RAND says, “I don’t think that the naval presence out 
there has anything to do with the protection of ships. It’s been politicized.”104 
What, then, might motivate the deployment of such extravagant force? These 
naval forces are explicitly part of broader government policies toward Somalia, 
East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, policies conceived within the fragile 
states discourse to contain the negative externalities of a weak or failed state. 
For international actors, the most concerning of these externalities is of course 
terrorism. Indeed, today, according to DFID’s Aden Abdi, “Drone attacks 
against terrorists are coming from the same warships patrolling the Gulf of 
Aden and Indian Ocean against piracy.”105  
Statistics compiled by Compass Risk Management show that crew 
fatalities have risen over the years, from two fatalities in 2007 to 32 in 2011, 
and several stakeholders point to increasing injuries and fatalities among both 
hostage crews and pirates (see Figure 5). Noor, of PUNSAA, says, “The  
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violence of piracy is new.”106 Mangan claims that accompanying the rise of 
violence in pirate operations is “an increase of violence in naval operations.” 
He adds, “As militaries get more violent, it makes sense that pirates are 
retaliating,” summing up the pirate attitude as, “‘Unless you release our guys, 
we won’t release yours’.”107 For example, the forces of CTF 151 may have 
provoked the February 2011 killing of four Americans aboard their yacht, the 
Quest, when authorities—against standard negotiation practices—took custody 
of two pirate negotiators who had come aboard the USS Sterett. Tailed by four 
US warships and apparently squabbling among themselves, pirates onboard the 
Quest panicked and killed the hostages, which prompted the naval capture of 
all pirates.108 In April 2011, for the first time, pirates held some hostages of the 
MV Asphalt Venture even after receiving a ransom for their release; Indian 
nationals were not released, “to exert pressure on the Indian Navy, which is 
notorious for its aggression, to release detained pirates and withhold force,” 
according to Andrew Mwangura, the pirate negotiator. Mwangura says this 
indicates a “shift to political motivations” for piracy.109 These events show that 
pirates—whose injury or murder of hostages is extremely rare and would be 
“akin to destroying elephant tusks,” or burning their money—are responding 
to naval aggression in kind, politicizing in the process.110  
The turbid legal regime of counter-piracy 
Like the War on Terror, the War on Piracy entails the construction of legal 
architecture in its support. Given the muddle of international and domestic 
laws on piracy, and that prosecuting captured pirates in Somalia is not entirely 
viable, piracy is becoming legally conflated with terrorism. UN agreements and 
resolutions are the legal platform for the War on Piracy, but its proponents 
have pursued law-making and prosecutions amid considerable legal ambiguity, 
which opens the door to exceptional legal practices and rights violations, as the 
War on Terror has proven. To make this argument, four manifestations of the 
counter-piracy legal regime are presented: (1) the 1988 Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention); (2) Executive Order 13536 signed by US 
President Barack Obama; (3) the emerging practice of detention at sea; and (4) 
the UN practice of promoting regional piracy prosecutions, notably in Kenya.   
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First, as the basis for prosecuting both pirates and other maritime 
criminals, the Bush administration’s 2007 Piracy Policy and 2008 Action Plan 
both invoke the standard of the 1988 SUA Convention and the 2005 Protocols 
to the SUA Convention. Recall that the SUA Convention was largely drafted in 
response to the Palestinian Liberation Front’s hijacking of a cruise ship in 
1985, extending state jurisdiction over international waters and mandating 
cooperation with maritime terrorism prosecutions of other States Parties. The 
2005 Protocols amended the SUA Convention to further criminalize the 
transport of anyone who has committed a hijacking or terrorist attack and the 
transport of materials intended to make biological, chemical or nuclear 
weapons. The SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocols mention “terrorist” or 
“terrorism” 23 times, but “pirate” or “piracy” none, so the Bush 
administration’s proposal that these instruments be used to prosecute pirates 
legally conflates them with terrorists.111 This corroborates the argument of 
Adam Young and Mark Valencia, who claim that the push to ratify the SUA 
Convention motivates the conflation of piracy and terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
The 2008 Action Plan further claims, “The 1979 Hostage Taking Convention, 
the 2000 Transnational Organized Crime Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist 
Financing Convention may apply to piracy cases in some circumstances.”112 
The first dangerously defines “all acts of taking of hostages as manifestations 
of international terrorism”; the second would unnecessarily group piracy with 
the illegal shipment of drugs, arms and people by sea; and the third would 
insist that pirate money is used or allocated for terrorist offenses, which 
remains unproven.113 
A deeper look into the content of the SUA Convention and its 2005 
Protocols reveals that it has gained newfound prominence amid post-9/11 
fears of maritime terrorism. Recall the rhetoric of ‘floating bombs’, including 
the threat of exploding a nuclear or dirty bomb in a port or sailing an oil tanker 
into a port, causing mass destruction. Fears of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) are particularly severe in the maritime domain. The 2005 National 
Strategy for Maritime Security warns, “Vessels can be used to transport 
powerful conventional explosives or WMD for detonation in a port or 
alongside an offshore facility.” It continues, “WMD issues are of the greatest 
concern since the maritime domain is the likely venue by which WMD will be 
brought into the US.”114 
With this fear of WMD terrorism in mind, the Bush administration in 
2003 established the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a multinational, 
informal effort whose primary objective was to interdict WMD trafficking by 
                                                
111 “Armed robbery” is mentioned once. International Maritime Organization, 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation [SUA Convention] (1988) and International Maritime 
Organization, Protocol of 2005 to the SUA Convention (2005). 
112 National Security Council, “Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa,” p. 13.  
113 UN International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979), Preamble. 
114 White House, “National Strategy for Maritime Security,” p. 4. 
29 
 
sea or air “to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”115 
Bjørn Møller of the Danish Institute for International Studies writes, “What 
makes it relevant for the struggle against piracy and maritime terrorism are the 
provisions for the search and seizure of ships and the term ‘non-state actors of 
proliferation’.”116 The PSI sought to operate within international law, yet the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary 
international law “do not contain any entitlement to stop and search a foreign 
ship simply because it is suspected to engage in proliferation activities.”117 
Clearly, alternative legal cover would be necessary for the PSI’s naval 
interdictions, and the US chose to pursue its counter-terrorism and 
nonproliferation agendas through the SUA Convention. Though the SUA 
Convention had previously focused only on maritime terrorism apart from the 
nuclear threat, “the US suggested amending the SUA Convention [with a 
nonproliferation clause] with the [ultimate] aim of combating terrorist activities 
on the high seas.”118 
And so, the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention criminalized the 
transport by sea of anyone who has committed a hijacking or terrorist attack 
and the transport by sea of “any equipment, fissionable materials…or related 
technology” intended to “significantly contribute to the design, manufacture or 
delivery of a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon.”119 To couch the WMD 
concern in counter-terrorism terminology, “the wording of the [amendments] 
resembles definitions of terrorist acts contained in UN conventions directed 
against specific aspects of terrorist activities.”120 Thus, based on the perceived 
but remote threat of WMD terrorism at sea, the US conflated the 
nonproliferation and counter-terrorism regimes in pursuit of legal cover for the 
Proliferation Security Initiative and the War on Terror.  
But would this be enough? The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention 
would take years to ratify, and even then demanded costly formal procedures 
to enable the boarding of a suspicious vessel in international waters. However, 
Article 110 of UNCLOS already stipulated “a ship may be forcibly boarded on 
the high seas if it is reasonably suspected of engaging in piracy or slave 
trade.”121 Maritime piracy was on the rise in 2005, and indeed—like 
proliferation before it—would shortly become entangled in the War on Terror. 
But the US is not party to UNCLOS, so chose the SUA Convention to justify 
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 its naval interdictions of suspected pirate vessels, thereby conflating its 
counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and counter-piracy purposes and laws. 
Unfortunately, the SUA Convention is a poor choice to interdict and prosecute 
pirates: Young and Valencia point out, “The enumeration of offences under its 
Article Three, even if interpreted broadly, will clearly cover only the serious but 
admittedly less common incidents of vessel hijackings and not the most 
common forms of piracy and armed robbery at sea.”122 
The second legal conflation of piracy and terrorism came in April 2010, 
when President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13536 proclaiming that 
protracted violence, piracy and the arms trade in Somalia “constitute an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of 
the United States.” The order continues to “declare a national emergency to 
deal with that threat.”123 It paves the way for the seizure of property and 
financial assets of Somali pirates by grouping them with terrorists. The order 
blacklists eleven individuals as members of Shabaab, though two of the 
eleven—Abdullahi Abshir, also known as “Boyah,” and Garaad Mohammed—
are pirate ringleaders, and not associates of Shabaab. Ransom payments to 
these pirates are thus banned. Shortland and Vothknecht say, “A policy of 
never negotiating with hostage takers is sub-optimal…and therefore unlikely to 
succeed.”124 What more, such an order is ineffective; Mwangura dismisses the 
relevance of the US ransom rule because payments can still be made under US 
law to the thousands of unlisted pirates, given the cooperation among gangs.125   
Third, an ongoing case in the US further elucidates the legal conflation of 
piracy and terrorism and identifies detention at sea as a high-risk arena for 
abuse. The case is the indictment of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a Somali 
man, for providing material support to terrorists. On April 19, 2011, at the 
prompt of informants, Warsame was caught in a skiff or fishing vessel (reports 
vary) in the Gulf of Aden for suspicion of support to Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. 
Some bloggers claim he is a pirate, though this has not been officially alleged.126 
Prior to his turnover to a New York court, Warsame was held and interrogated 
on the warship USS Boxer for two months, which amounts to “secret” and 
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“extralegal” detention, according to the editors of The New York Times.127 The 
USS Boxer is the former flagship of CTF 151, the US-led counter-piracy task 
force, and is now stationed in the Gulf of Aden to launch special operations 
and drone attacks as necessary against terrorist targets in Yemen and 
Somalia.128 The US seems to be taking advantage of its counter-piracy 
presence, which is conceived within the War on Terror and which appears 
seamless with the counter-terrorist task force, to advance its interests, which 
may compromise rights of detainees like Warsame under the Geneva 
Conventions. While Obama decided to try Warsame in a civilian court as 
opposed to Guantanamo Bay, the practice of detention at sea can nonetheless 
set a slippery slope to injustice. The New York Times editors suggest this may 
indicate “another parallel system of unlimited detention and interrogation 
without rights outside…constitutional norms.”129 
This legal interpretation is disputed, but the point persists, that the 
Warsame case can open the door to the abuse of powers and rights violations 
in America’s pursuit of war, namely indefinite detention at sea for a range of 
offenses loosely tied to terrorism.130 In April 2011, the UN urged the 
establishment of legal procedures for detention of pirates at sea.131 In June 
2011, Admiral William McRaven, commander of the naval team that killed 
Osama bin Laden, testified before the Armed Services Committee of the US 
Congress. The following exchange took place between Senator Lindsey 
Graham of South Carolina and McRaven: 
GRAHAM: If you caught someone tomorrow in Yemen, Somalia, you name the 
theater, outside of Afghanistan, where would you detain that person? 
MCRAVEN: Sir, right now, as you’re well aware, that is always a difficult issue for 
us…No two cases seem to be alike…In many cases, we will put them on a naval 
vessel and we will hold them until we can either get a case to prosecute them in 
US court or… 
GRAHAM: What’s the longest we can keep somebody on the ship? 
MCRAVEN: Sir, I think it depends on whether or not we think we can prosecute 
that individual in a US court or we can return him to a third party country. 
GRAHAM: What if you can’t do either one of those? 
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MCRAVEN: Sir, it—again, if we can’t do either one of those, then we’ll release 
that individual and that becomes the—the unenviable option, but it is an 
option.132 
The release by the US military of enemy combatants is unlikely, especially in 
the absence of a standard procedure for their handling, which is perhaps why 
Graham seemed worried in his questioning about the proposed length of 
detention. The Guardian reports, “There is some evidence that the US 
government is turning to detention at sea as a way of avoiding legal and 
political impediments in the treatment of terror suspects, both domestically 
and on the international stage.”133 Since 2005, following the blowouts of 
Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, it appears possible that the conflation of 
piracy and terrorism has been crafted with the propagation of detention at sea 
in mind, an explanation that would be consistent with Young and Valencia’s 
argument about the US pursuit of extraterritorial jurisdiction over international 
waters. 
Fourth, the prosecution of pirates in Kenya, from apprehension to 
sentencing, also shows signs of conflating piracy with terror. The UN and the 
naval missions of NATO, the EU and the US all support the prosecution of 
captured pirates, but there is reluctance on the part of every nation to detain 
and try foreigners in lengthy, politicized, expensive processes. While fourteen 
non-African governments—including the US, Spain and the Netherlands—
have tried, convicted and sentenced pirates, there is fear in these countries that 
pirates would prefer a short jail sentence followed by asylum in the country of 
their punishment, to returning to Somalia. The response is the sponsorship of 
detention and trials in regional prisons and courts, namely in Kenya and the 
Seychelles, and more recently in Somaliland, Puntland, Mauritius and Tanzania. 
In return for millions of dollars in aid for the modernization of their prisons, 
police forces and courts, these governments have signed agreements to 
prosecute pirates, but are “hot and cold” in their acceptance of cases, 
sometimes rejecting new cases for months on end.134  
Once pirates are apprehended, they may be held in the brig of a naval 
vessel for several weeks, as it “takes a while to identify the country of 
prosecution and sail to port,” according to Keith Wileman, Legal Liaison 
Officer for EUNAVFOR.135 This detention at sea, as in the Warsame case, 
may be illegal, especially given the naval proclivity to apprehend fishermen and 
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the Kenyan law that requires a detainee’s production before a magistrate within 
24 hours of arrest.136 Such detention can also open the door to further abuse. 
In one ongoing case in which 24 alleged pirates were arrested by the Danish 
warship HDMS Esbern Snare, the suspects were held for 38 days before they 
were transferred to Kenya, and a Mombasa court is investigating the defense’s 
claims of “serious physical [and] mental torture” at the hands of the Royal 
Danish Navy.137 Mombasa’s Directorate of Public Prosecutions has received 
requests for prosecution of pirates up to three weeks after the apprehension 
date. State counsel Alex Muteti says, “Some packages come to our desk with 
insufficient evidence, or without evidence at all.” In these cases, Kenya will 
refuse prosecution. Muteti says, “We do not want to be regarded as the 
Kenyan Guantanamo.”138 If accepted, a case can last two to three years before 
a ruling is issued. Wileman says some cases begun in 2009 are ongoing, and 
Muteti says that of the 130 alleged pirates in Kenyan jails, only five cases have 
been concluded.139 Furthermore, Abdi of DFID says, “Trying pirates in Kenya 
cultivates the common Kenyan perception of Somalis as Muslim criminals 
through TV images and news reports, exacerbating the existing stigma of 
Somali refugees, residents and citizens in the eyes of many Kenyans.”140 
Indeed, while we watched Citizen TV’s ‘News at 9’ program one evening with 
a Kenyan family, a segment ran about a pirate trial. A young man turned to us 
and said, “It is good that Kenya is stopping these Al-Qaeda networks.” 
On November 5, 2010, seventeen suspected pirates apprehended at sea by 
the US Navy were acquitted in a Mombasa court. Police then re-arrested them 
under the charge of unlawful presence in Kenya, though a judge ordered them 
repatriated to Somalia. Nine days later, 139 illegal immigrants including the 
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seventeen suspected pirates were transferred to a jail in Garissa near the Somali 
border, after which their fate is unknown.141 When we investigated this matter, 
Alinur Dengicha, an officer of Kenya’s Anti-Terrorist Police Unit stationed in 
Garissa told us, “Kenya has no terrorism act, so suspected militants are 
charged instead with unlawful presence in Kenya. The maximum penalty is a 
couple months, after which they are released…I don’t know where.”142 Himish 
Abdikadir of the British High Commission in Nairobi says, “War on Terror 
policies...can lead to the misapplication or confusion of standards, for example, 
the way they might try terrorists and pirates, when they’re different things.”143 
Taken together, these facts cast doubt on the legitimacy of prosecutions of 
pirates and terrorists in Kenya, and point to a legal conflation of the two 
groups. 
In short, piracy and counter-piracy are now entangled with the War on 
Terror and its excesses, which are crystallizing in Somalia on land and offshore. 
The discursive conflation of piracy and terrorism, it seems, is being 
operationalized, militarily and legally. It could take material shape by providing 
international legal legitimacy for counter-insurgency forces to enter Somali 
waters and lands under the guise of counter-piracy operations. This may be 
unfolding presently, with the EU’s March 2012 approval to attack pirate bases 
on land, coinciding with Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s military interventions against 
Shabaab and a 5000-troop boost to the African Union Mission in Somalia. 
Given the already fuzzy distinction between counter-piracy and counter-
terrorism operations, the counter-piracy measures of detention at sea and 
specialized trial could be adopted in counter-terrorism operations, providing 
the veil of legal sanction of what might otherwise amount to violations of 
international law.  
Skeptics may acknowledge the false conflation of piracy with terrorism, 
but believe that the engagement of similar units and tactics is nonetheless 
required to defeat each threat, or is the only convenient or practical option. 
Such arguments, however, deny the unique operations and motivations of each 
phenomenon and hastily assume that similar or identical military and legal 
instruments may be used to combat threats as divergent as piracy and 
terrorism. 
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5   Conclusion 
In sum, the conflation of piracy with terrorism can be backdated to 9/11, and 
the emergence of Shabaab on the scene in 2007 amid the simultaneous upsurge 
in piracy propelled this conflation, leading to the use of strategies of the War 
on Terror when fighting pirates and spawning a War on Piracy. This War on 
Piracy mirrors the premises of the War on Terror by adopting strategies that 
advance militarization and legal obfuscation, pushing pirates to become more 
daring and dangerous in response.  
One must remember that pirates and Islamists are not natural bedfellows. 
It was the “fear of European conquest” that motivated Barbary pirates and 
Barbary Islamists to join forces in the sixteenth century and “set out on their 
sea jihad,” presenting an unprecedented threat to the global order of the age. 
Historian Adrian Tinniswood writes, “Without that fear of conquest, Barbary’s 
socialised piracy would never have grown into the scourge of Christendom, its 
followers would not have become the shock troops on the front line of the 
defence of the Islamic world.”144 In the early nineteenth century, the US sent 
frigates and Marines “to the shores of Tripoli” in the Barbary Wars, conflating 
maritime criminals with Islamist governors and driving the two actors ever 
closer together.145  
History may be repeating itself in Somalia today, as foreign military 
intervention drives pirates and militant Islamists to attempt cooperation under 
duress, further upsetting the prospects for security and stability in the Horn of 
Africa. In this scenario, counter-terrorism strategies are bound to fail against 
piracy; they are simply beside the point. As Tinniswood writes, “[The global 
counter-piracy operation] continues to fail, for exactly the same reasons that it 
failed in the past: as the story of the Barbary pirates shows, the only long term 
solution to the problem lies onshore, and it can only be achieved by making 
fundamental changes within a culture which regards piracy as a legitimate 
activity.”146 Somali piracy would thus be best addressed on land, through 
governance strategies that delink it from the militarism of the War on Terror. 
From the lens of securitization theory, “Security should be seen as a negative, 
as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics…When considering 
securitizing moves such as…a ‘war on crime’, one has to weigh the always 
problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible 
advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization.”147 As implied here, 
desecuritization would entail a shift from military to civilian counter-piracy 
strategies. 
Stephan Klingebiel claims that short-term, “myopic” military responses 
“should not be allowed to obscure the fact that long-term development goals 
                                                
144 Adrian Tinniswood, Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests and Captivity in the 
Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean (London: Vintage, 2010), p. 300. 
145 The US Marines’ Hymn begins: “From the Halls of Montezuma / To the shores of 
Tripoli / We fight our country’s battles / In the air, on land, and sea.”  
146 Tinniswood, Pirates of Barbary, pp. xv-xvi. 
147 Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, Security, p. 29.  
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must be assigned high priority.”148 The first step to crafting desecuritized, 
developmental solutions to piracy is freeing up the funds to do so. Peter Chalk 
writes, “The cost of deploying one frigate to the Gulf of Aden for six 
months…could theoretically cover the wages of 100,000 police officers over 
the same period.”149 Indeed, drawing down the counter-piracy forces off the 
Horn of Africa and building the capacities of locally owned and culturally 
acceptable law enforcement in Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central 
Somalia would better prevent piracy at sea. If successful, such strategies may 
also contain and weaken terrorists onshore. Other steps may include 
embracing the rules of engagement proscribing aggressive rescue operations 
that endanger the lives of captive crews and launching efforts to fight illegal 
fishing in order to earn the trust of Somali communities.  
Of course, there may be less political will to usher in an era of peace in 
Somalia than most domestic and international actors are willing to admit. Anja 
Shortland contends that “Puntland’s political elites are…unlikely to move 
decisively against piracy” because of trickle-down economic benefits to 
Puntland communities from piracy.150 Using satellite imagery (nighttime light 
emissions and high resolution daytime images), she demonstrates that the 
coastal villages of Hobyo and Eyl and especially the urban centers of Garowe 
and Bosasso have experienced increases in affluence out of step with the 
region, and explains why piracy is the cause.151 Moreover, analyzing data from 
the Food Analysis and Security Unit – Somalia, Shortland shows how the 
injection of ransom payments into Puntland communities offsets rises in food 
prices amid the global commodity boom, increases the wages of casual workers 
in pirate boomtowns, and drives up the price of cattle, benefitting 
pastoralists.152 International actors also have limited incentives to change the 
status quo of piracy, according to Sarah Percy and Shortland. Shipowners 
prefer to gamble than to implement even the cheapest onboard anti-piracy 
measures, because of the low probability of attack. Navies, given their 
mandate, need only to hinder piracy, not end it, in order to show they are 
successful, because of widespread recognition that the ultimate solution must 
play out on land. Insurance companies earn considerable profits off piracy and 
the confusion about maritime terrorism, as do private security contractors who 
have recently joined the counter-piracy effort off Puntland.153 Percy and 
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Shortland write, “Piracy is…not just profitable in Somalia, but creates 
opportunities for businesses around the world.”154 They conclude, “The players 
on the Somali pirate stage…may be in a symbiotic state, where there are few 
incentives for anyone involved in any aspect of piracy—whether perpetrating it 
or attempting to control it—to alter what they are doing.”155 
In short, the conflation of piracy with terrorism in media, academia and 
policy is unmerited and counter-piracy initiatives should be detached from 
counter-terrorism commands and strategies. Tinniswood writes, “Pirates are 
history. The history of piracy, whether on the Barbary Coast or in the Horn of 
Africa, shows us—what? That we never learn? That we invent our heroes? 
That those we cast as demons play their parts too well? All of those things. 
Above all, it shows us that the demons are human, too.”156 
To break the cycle of history, then, it is time we start learning and stop 
inventing our heroes. Most importantly, if the demons are human, too, then it 
is time to stop casting them as demons. 
                                                
154 Percy and Shortland, “The Business of Piracy,” p. 27. 
155 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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Appendix: List of  informants and interview dates 
Shamus Mangan, Prosecutions Advisor, Counter-Piracy Programme, UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime 
July 13, 2011, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Aden Maow Abdi, Somalia Programme Officer, UK Department for 
International Development 
July 15, 2011, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Noor. M. Noor, President, Puntland Non-State Actors’ Association 
July 15, 2011, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Himish Mahmoud Abdikadir, Political Officer for Somalia, British High 
Commission 
July 21, 2011, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Alinur Dengicha, Officer, Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, Kenya Police 
July 25, 2011, Garissa, Kenya 
 
Keith Wileman, Legal Liaison Officer, EU Naval Mission for Somalia 
July 27, 2011, Mombasa, Kenya 
 
Alex Muteti, Principal State Counsel, Kenya Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
July 27, 2011, Mombasa, Kenya 
 
Andrew Mwangura, Coordinator, East African Seafarers’ Assistance 
Programme 
July 31, 2011, Mombasa, Kenya 
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